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Variation within Limits: An Evolutionary Approach
 to the Structure and Dynamics of the Multiform
Michael D. C. Drout
One1 of Albert Lord’s more surprising discoveries about living oral traditions was that no 
two oral performances of the South Slavic epic that he collected were precisely  the same (1953).2 
Scholars before Milman Parry and Lord seem to have assumed that any long performance must 
have been of a text that had been memorized verbatim. It took the Theory of Oral Composition 
as originally developed by  Parry and Lord and elaborated and refined in the decades since3  to 
explain why in many traditions no two performances are the same at the level of the word and 
sentence even though the audiences and the performers state that the “same” story  is being 
performed (cf. Foley  2002:12-20). Recent work has shown how the influence of the 
“performance arena” and the differing skill sets and tendencies of individual singers contribute to 
the significant variation in the exact words used in any given performance of a specific song 
(Foley 1995:8-11). But although individual performances vary, they do not vary  infinitely, for if 
they  did, there would be no tradition. Oral Theory  has used the term “multiform” to describe 
verbal or textual entities that display this “variation within limits” (Foley 1991:6-8, 1998:149).
Although use of “multiform” both as adjective and noun is widespread in scholarship, it 
remains difficult to find an agreed-upon definition. Lauri Honko’s description of multiforms as 
“repeatable and artistic expressions of variable length which are constitutive for narration and 
function as generic markers” (Honko 1998:100-05; cf. Foley 1995:102) is probably as close to a 
consensus as one can find, but the problem that Lord noted in The Singer of Tales remains: 
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“unlike the oral poet, we are not accustomed to thinking in terms of fluidity. We find it  difficult 
to grasp  anything that is multiform. It seems to us necessary to construct an ideal text or seek an 
original, and we remain dissatisfied with an ever-changing phenomenon” (1960:100). Despite the 
efforts of many scholars to explain the phenomenon of multiformity (perhaps epitomized by 
Foley’s How to Read an Oral Poem [2002]), it remains difficult  to think and talk about the 
multiform without collapsing it to a single, textual entity.4 Scholars do not even agree completely 
on the size of multiforms: Parry and Lord’s original approach limited varying formulas to 
circumstances with identical metrical conditions (although Lord also discussed “themes” that 
were groupings of ideas [1960:68]), but more recent work has identified much larger multiforms 
that extend well beyond sentence length (Honko 1998:102-14), and the scholarship  seems to be 
moving in the direction of identifying as multiforms even complete songs (Foley 1998).5  The 
work of Gregory  Nagy in developing an “evolutionary” model has been influential in this area, in 
particular his view that the multiform should be understood in relative rather than absolute terms, 
so that any  particular composition could be more or less multiform “along a graded 
continuum” (Nagy 1996, 2001:109-10). That multiforms vary at different levels from the micro 
to the macro is borne out by studies such as Honko’s of Siri epic or Foley’s work with the 
variants collected by  Parry  and Lord (Foley 1998). Nevertheless, significant disagreements 
among researchers remain, both in theoretical terms and, more specifically, about the relative 
multiformity—and attendant orality—of particular works (for example, the Homeric Iliad versus 
the Cypria [Finkelberg 2000; Nagy 2001]).
This state of difficulty  is not confined to purely oral, or even primarily oral, traditions, 
either. In medieval studies Paul Zumthor’s discussion of mouvance—most succinctly  expressed 
by Bernard Cerquiglini’s assertion that (1989:111) “l’écriture médiévale ne produit pas de 
variantes, elle est variance” (“medieval writing does not produce variants, it is variance”)—
brought about significant changes in both theoretical approaches and editorial practices (Zumthor 
1972, 1987).6  Although Cerquiglini’s position is seen as extreme in contemporary  medieval 
studies, the variable nature of texts—even when they are not  considered to be particularly  close 
to an oral tradition—has become more central to scholarship. Katherine O’Brien O’Keeffe has 
demonstrated that in the Old English tradition “an oral poem did not automatically become a 
fixed text upon writing” (O’Brien O’Keeffe 1990:46), and more recently Gísli Sigursson’s work 
on Old Icelandic sagas has shown that even long prose texts are surprisingly multiform 
(Sigursson 2004 and 2012). Analysis of multiformity is therefore not restricted to the discipline 
of oral tradition studies but is instead a general literary problem (although the variable nature of 
texts is often masked by editorial practices).
But despite developments both applied and theoretical, the challenge that Lord identified 
in 1960 remains: our minds find it difficult to grasp multiformity, and this cognitive weakness 
hampers our efforts to analyze this extremely important aspect of traditions. Fortunately, other 
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disciplines have grappled with similar conceptual difficulties. Evolutionary biology, in particular, 
has been struggling with problems of multiformity since the “heroic age” of natural history 
collection in the nineteenth century, when it became apparent to scientists that the morphologies 
of individual animals within a species could vary substantially.7  For centuries biologists had 
spoken of individual animals as imperfect representations of the ideal morphology of a given 
species, but this typological approach to variation became unsatisfactory as the Darwinian 
revolution unfolded and it became increasingly  clear that there was no way that an idealized 
species type could exert any influence on individual animals. In response, biologists developed 
the “biological species concept,” the idea that the ability to interbreed is the only non-subjective 
test of whether or not two variant  forms belong to the same species. From the biological species 
concept arose what Ernst Mayr dubbed “population thinking” (Mayr 1959; O’Hara 1997), an 
understanding of species not as natural types but as a varying population of interbreeding 
individuals. This population thinking is analogous to the frame of mind that scholars in oral 
traditional studies try  to adopt towards the problem of the multiform, which cannot be captured 
in a single text  or performance, or even in the minds of full participants in a given tradition 
(Foley 1991:6-10).
The parallels between oral tradition studies and population thinking in biology are clear, 
but there are problems that prevent us from applying unmodified biological approaches to the 
problem of the multiform. Population thinking is difficult because the human mind easily thinks 
in terms of forms and types and is less able to visualize a statistical range of morphological 
differences. More importantly, the dynamics of cultural evolution are not fully  captured by a 
purely  biological approach: because our minds construct cognitive prototypes—epitomes of 
particular mental categories—from features detected by our perceptual systems, the multiform 
that scholars discuss is an abstraction based on the characteristics of a population of individual 
cultural entities held in different individual minds. When we think about “the multiform” we are 
(sometimes despite ourselves) constructing a prototype from those instantiations of the tradition 
that we have encountered. This process is not limited to scholars studying oral traditions; it 
affects participants in traditions as well.
In what follows I will argue that the existence of cognitive prototypes and the dynamics 
of human communication generate selection pressure that limits the variation of individual 
entities within a cognitive category. The population that makes up the multiform evolves towards 
prototypes, and this evolution supports morphological stability. The structure of multiforms can 
be described in terms of a morpho-semantic hierarchy in which formal features can, through the 
process of traditional referentiality, become associated with each other across levels of the 
hierarchy. This phenomenon, feature interlink, tends over time to bind cultural entities into stable 
configurations. We can conceptualize the variability  space for any such cultural entity as an 
adaptive landscape, but we add to this visualization (invented for biology) the non-biological 
variation of the cognitive prototype exerting selection pressure on entities to evolve towards a 
prototypical form. The variation-within-limits of the multiform is then the expected result of the 
 VARIATION WITHIN LIMITS: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 449
7  For the types and distribution of variation that can be found within species,  see Gould 1985.  For the 
biological species concept, see Mayr 1942. 
structure and dynamics of a cultural entity shaped by  both the human mind and universal 
processes of replication and selection.
It is not the goal of this essay  to obviate current theorizing about the multiform or provide 
evidence for one side or the other in disputes about the relative multiformity of different 
traditions. Rather, the conceptual framework proposed here is intended to enable the integration 
of various analyses by scholars working in multiple traditions and using a variety of approaches. 
Oral tradition studies were born when Parry  and Lord combined philological analysis with 
sociological fieldwork and created a whole greater than the sum of its parts. Thanks to decades of 
good stewardship, the field has continued to bring together divergent perspectives, producing 
knowledge that could never have been discovered within the bounds of any single discipline. A 
convergence between evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, and oral traditional studies is 
another step in this continuing development.
The Adaptive Landscape
Imagine a rugged landscape characterized by valleys and peaks, foothills and plateaus. 
The horizontal area of the landscape represents morphospace, all the possible forms of the 
particular organisms or entities we are examining. The height at any  given point  represents 
“fitness,” the degree to which the particular characteristics of the entity enable it to survive and 
reproduce. In biology that concept of fitness is tied to the physical competition for resources that 
always become scarce as population expands to the carrying capacity of the particular 
environment. Fitness in cultural evolution is only slightly  different, but the limiting factors are 
not those of the physical environment but instead ones primarily  associated with finite human 
attention and memory. Some cultural entities have forms that make them more likely to be 
noticed, remembered, and re-transmitted than others. We describe these reproducing 
morphologies as having greater fitness than those forms that are not reproduced. Therefore, by 
simple inspection of the landscape, we can judge the fitness of a given form: the higher up a 
mountain, the more fit to its local environment a form is; the lower down in a valley, the less fit. 
This adaptive landscape (or fitness landscape) was devised by the biologist  Sewall Wright in 
1932.8 Long used for thought experiments in evolutionary  biology, the adaptive landscape can be 
a precise mathematical tool,9  but it is also a powerful metaphor that represents complex 
interrelations between comparative morphology and fitness in ways our minds find intuitively 
simple: relationships of topography.
To better understand the adaptive landscape, it  is helpful to begin with a simplified 
model, see how it works, and then expand the model to account for more complex phenomena.10 
To this end we will construct a representation of variant fitness in the Anglo-Saxon poem 
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Cædmon’s Hymn,11 a short  text from the eighth century that has long been at the heart of debates 
about the oral nature of Anglo-Saxon poetry.12  According to the Venerable Bede, Cædmon was 
an illiterate cowherd who was given the miraculous gift of poetry. Previously unable to sing at 
all, after being visited by an angel in a dream, Cædmon became able to turn instruction in church 
doctrine or Christian history into Old English verse.13  The story of Cædmon has been seen as a 
clear example of oral traditional poetry  in Anglo-Saxon, and an analysis of the story and poem 
was the foundation of Francis Peabody Magoun’s 1955 article, “Bede’s Story of Cædmon: The 
Case History of an Anglo-Saxon Singer,” the first essay to use oral tradition approaches for the 
study of Old English texts. Although the precise degree to which our current texts of the poem 
reflect an Anglo-Saxon oral tradition is disputed, for the purposes of this argument I will adopt 
the broadly accepted notion that the poem represents many  of the features of oral tradition in Old 
English. At the very  least it has a greater claim on oral origins than any other poem in Anglo-
Saxon, and there is no evidence inconsistent with oral origins.14 
The hymn is particularly  valuable for developing a simplified adaptive landscape because 
we have many manuscript witnesses that include a number of variants. There are twenty-one 
medieval manuscripts that include Cædmon’s Hymn. These have been collected and edited in the 
most recent edition by Daniel O’Donnell (2005). For reasons that will become clear, we will 
focus on line five, which appears in Elliott van Kirk Dobbie’s standard edition as “he ærest scop 
eorðan bearnum” (“he first shaped, for the sons of earth . . . ”) (1942:106).15  There are two 
variations in this line, one in the a- and one in the b-verse. In the a-verse the word scop appears 
in thirteen manuscripts, while the prefixed form ge-scop appears eight times in the corpus. (The 
ge- prefix in Anglo-Saxon can indicate a perfective sense of a verb.) Even more significant is the 
variation in the b-verse: eleven manuscripts have forms that mean “of earth” (the eorðan 
recension) while ten have “of old”16  (the ylda recension). Other minor variations throughout the 
Cædmon’s Hymn corpus (with one exception)17 are orthographic or dialectal, and I interpret  them 
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O’Brien-O’Keeffe 1990. (For a parallel in Classical Studies, see Nagy 2001:112-15 with discussion of the 
differences in variation between the Iliad and the Cypria.) A very short text such as Cædmon’s Hymn can easily be 
memorized verbatim, thus limiting—but not entirely eliminating—variation. 
15  O’Donnell reconstructs the hypothetical ancestor of the line as “he aerist scop eordu 
barnum” (2005:205).
16  “Of old” is usually taken as a metaphor for “of men,” that is, “conceived as the successive generations, 
or men of old” (Pope 2001:193). 
17 In MS Tr1 (using O’Donnell’s sigla), hu appears instead of he.
not as representative of substantive variation in the poetic multiform but instead as generated in 
the copying process.18
We can represent the total variation of the line thus: 
A: scop 
a: gescop 
B: eorðan
b: ylda
The four morphotypes of line five—AB, Ab, aB, and ab—are represented in the 
manuscript record in different numbers:
AB: 9 appearances / 43% (MSS Br, B1, Hr, C, CArms, Ld, T1, P1, To)
Ab: 4 appearances / 19% (MSS M, Di, P, PSanM)
aB: 2 appearances / 10% (MSS Ca, O)
ab: 6 appearances / 29% (MSS Tr1, Bd, H, Ln, Mg, W)19
For the purpose of this argument we will treat representation in the manuscript record as a 
proxy for the fitness of a particular morphotype and therefore calculate fitness of a given form as 
the fraction of the total population it represents. This argument does require two potentially 
problematic assumptions. First, we assume that morphological variation is visible to selection so 
that the particular form of a line affects its likelihood of being reproduced. Without very large 
data sets it is impossible to prove this point with statistical rigor, but the evaluation of singers 
and performances by  participants in traditions (and later by scholars) demonstrates that different 
forms of songs are considered more or less aesthetically accomplished and thus more or less 
likely to be reproduced, either by being remembered and performed by other singers or by being 
incorporated into textual records (see Foley 2004:102-06). Evaluators must be basing their 
evaluation on detectable variations in performances, so it is not a great leap to suggest that even 
subtle differences in word choice affect a variant’s inclusive fitness; the model system merely 
isolates a few particular variants. More problematic is the assumption that the distribution of 
variants in the surviving documentary record represents the distribution of those variants in the 
original complete archive. Preservation can be evidence, albeit probabilistic evidence, for the 
inclusive fitness of variants, but the Anglo-Saxon documentary record is seriously incomplete, 
and we cannot know if preservation of witnesses of Cædmon’s Hymn was non-random. It  is 
possible that there were many additional manuscript witnesses of the poem that have been lost, 
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19  Percentages are slightly rounded and therefore do not total 100%. Manuscripts in each category are 
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and these might show completely  different distributions of variants (although we have no direct 
evidence for this hypothesis). However, as long as we remain cautious about drawing any 
conclusions that rely too heavily  on any specific numerical distribution, we can use manuscript 
preservation as a crude proxy for overall popularity. This proxy is not ideal, but we must make 
do with the information available to us, and in any event the point of the exercise is to develop a 
simplified model. A much more complex landscape could be generated by the variants of Siri 
epic recorded in Honko (1998), but using Cædmon’s Hymn allows us to see more clearly  the 
workings of the model before we elaborate it. 
We can graphically illustrate the fitness of the population of variants by creating a three-
dimensional representation in which the x-axis indicates the scop / gescop, the y-axis the 
eorðan / ylda variation, and the z-axis the fitness of each morphotype.
Figure 1 illustrates the fitness of all 
the possible combinations of characteristics 
and is therefore a model of the fitness space 
of our model.20  The three-dimensional 
landscape allows us to grasp intuitively 
which combinations of characters are more 
and less fit, and to what degrees they are 
similar to each other (based on proximity in 
the diagram). If there were further 
variations in the particular characters (that 
is, if there were a third, fourth, or fifth term 
that varied instead of all witnesses being 
either eorðan or ylda), we could add more 
blocks to the diagram, eventually creating a 
“skyscraper” landscape, as in Figure 2. 
We can also represent additional varying 
characters by continuing to add dimensions to the 
diagram (for example, adding a fourth dimension 
to represent the variation between he in 5a, which 
occurs in 20 manuscripts, and hu, which appears 
only in MS Tr1). But fitness landscapes in higher 
dimensions, while amenable to mathematical 
analysis, are not easily visualized, so we will 
work in the familiar three dimensions. This approach is justified not only because the purpose of 
the adaptive landscape is to help channel intuition, but because many minor characteristics may 
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Figure 1. Representation of the relative fitness of 
morphotypes of Cædmon’s Hymn, line 5.
Figure 2. “Skyscraper” landscape represents fitness 
of multiple discrete morphotypes.
be correlated, as variables are often dependent 
upon each other.
The “skyscraper” visualization represents 
only discrete changes, such as that between 
eorðan and ylda, so each particular morphotype is 
represented by  a large block. But adaptive 
landscapes can also represent a much more finely 
grained morphospace simply by adding many 
small blocks to represent the range of minor 
variants such as we would find in a longer 
passage of text  (see Figure 3). How continuous 
the landscape will be depends upon the 
underlying dynamics of the system: some 
characteristics, such as sentence or scene length, 
can vary continuously; others are discrete. But 
even if all characters were discrete, there are so 
many features in even reasonably  small 
multiforms—such as “Silken Cradle,” “Caring,” 
and “Name-giving” in Siri epic as sung by Gopala 
Naika (Honko 1998:106-10)—that  at the level of 
compression required for us to see its contours in 
a single figure, the adaptive landscape will look 
like terrain (see Figure 4).
The adaptive landscape represents the full range of possible forms for the entity  in 
question, but  not all of these forms may  actually exist in the world.21  If we want to use the 
landscape to perform thought experiments on the evolution of cultural entities, we must populate 
it, either by scattering entities randomly (representing an initial diversity of forms) or by having 
them start out homogenous and therefore occupying only a small part of the landscape, as in 
Figure 4.
We simulate morphological evolution in the population by applying rules of change and 
inheritance to the entities in the adaptive landscape. For example, we might allow every entity to 
have offspring who are slightly different from their “parent” entities. We can then simulate 
competition by making the offspring with the highest fitness score reproduce in subsequent 
generations. We can also limit the total number of individuals, with those with the lower fitness 
values being eliminated in favor of those with higher fitness values. By  running the simulations 
and examining the underlying mathematics, we can predict how varying entities will come to 
populate the fitness landscape over multiple generations. The most significant phenomenon we 
will observe is that lineages tend to “hill-climb” up  the adaptive landscape to the peaks from the 
valleys through the replacement of less fit forms by one with greater fitness and thus greater 
height in the landscape (Sewall Wright 1932; Simpson 1953:154-59). Variation appears to be 
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Figure 3. Many minor variations of morphotypes 
create a near-gradient.
Figure 4. Adaptive landscape populated with entities.
channeled towards the local optimum in morphospace because of the “ratchet effect”: 
improvements in fitness are noticeable because those organisms occupy  new locations in the 
adaptive landscape, but decreases in fitness are invisible because they either put an organism into 
a location that is already occupied (hence not visibly different) or a lower-level spot that leads to 
extinction. The entities themselves are not moving; they are simply reproducing and thus 
bequeathing both similarity  and variability  to their offspring, but the effect is to populate the 
higher areas of morphospace that represent greater fitness. The peaks in the landscape, then, are 
attractors, locations at which lineages will eventually  arrive if they continue to evolve in the 
fitness landscape. 
The Morpho-Semantic Hierarchy
The variants we examined in line five of Cædmon’s Hymn are lexical (eorðan/ylda) and 
morphological (gescop/scop). These variants do not affect the alliteration or prosody of the line 
because the Old English poetic system allowed vocalic alliteration (so the eo diphthong 
alliterates with y) and ge- is unstressed and so in this metrical context optional. It is not difficult 
to imagine other variants, however, that would affect the alliteration and meter of the line. For 
example, if eorðan were to be replaced with manna (“of men”) or some other word with 
consonantal stress, the line would no longer alliterate. If scop were replaced with a multi-syllabic 
verb, the line might no longer scan properly. Similarly, there are an enormous number of words 
that simply could not fill the eorðan/ylda slot for reasons of grammar and sense: “God shaped 
earth for the yellow of fish” would not be likely  to be reproduced by an Anglo-Saxon poet or a 
later scribe.22  The limits to variation are not restricted to the grammatical and formal properties 
of the line but also include semantic features of words, phrases, sentences, and larger units of 
meaning. Furthermore, the semantic fitness of a particular unit  is influenced not only by its 
denotative meaning, but also by  its connotations. A particular combination of words could be 
grammatical, flawlessly alliterating, and productive of an aesthetically  pleasing visual image but 
nevertheless have low inclusive fitness because it was politically or socially  unacceptable to 
performer or audience.
We can arrange these fitness criteria along a morpho-semantic hierarchy, an arrangement 
of attributes from those utterly  essential to the most nebulous: some parts of speech simply 
cannot substitute for others,23  and variation in rhyme scheme and meter is significantly limited, 
but a replacement for “bearnum” in line five of Cædmon’s Hymn probably could be one of many 
agents, and the subtle degrees of orthodoxy in the poem’s oft-debated creation theology would 
probably  not  be a complete determinant of whether or not the poem is copied. Grammatical, 
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the language of the scribe and the language of the exemplar, some scribes can preserve (or produce) nonsensical 
readings (for example, line 2921 of Beowulf, in which neither scribe seems to have recognized the name of the 
Merovingians [see Shippey 2005]).
23 Note, though, how e. e. cummings generates aesthetic effects by violating these constraints in poems like 
“anyone lived in a pretty how town” (1957:351-52).
metrical, formal, and semantic qualities are higher up in the hierarchy than are the thematic and 
symbolic features of a work, and orthographic and dialectal variation is less constrained than 
changes in lexis or morphology. However, in differing cultural environments, different levels of 
the morpho-semantic hierarchy will contribute differentially to inclusive fitness.
Feature Interlink
But even though the morpho-semantic hierarchy is present, it is not arranged like an 
onion in neatly  separable layers. Rather, particular characteristics can be linked to each other 
across levels, so that change in one necessitates change in the other. The example given above of 
manna replacing eorðan or ylda shows that a change in meaning could be blocked by the criteria 
of alliteration if the variables are not independent. Manna may contribute more than eorðan to 
fitness in semantic terms, but  the degradation in alliterative fitness may be so great that the 
resultant morphotype would occupy a significantly  lower position in the adaptive landscape. The 
space between morphologies may therefore not be a smooth gradient in all directions, and when 
this is the case, the variation of a multiform is constrained in multiple dimensions.
The phenomenon of traditional referentiality further constrains variability. Traditional 
referentiality is the process by which a specific formula, type-scene, or other recognized pattern 
in a text  calls up pars pro toto, that is, “a context enormously larger and more echoic than the 
text or the work itself” (Foley 1991:6-8), thus allowing “grey-eyed Athena” or “Hector of the 
glancing helm” to invoke not merely one attribute of a well-known character, but that character’s 
entire persona as developed throughout a tradition (Foley 1995:5). Traditional referentiality is 
generated by  the combination of repetition with associative memory (Drout 2006). As a 
multiform is copied and re-copied, its various features become associated with each other. Thus a 
particular rhyme scheme and prosody (at a lower or middle level in the morpho-semantic 
hierarchy) can become linked through associative memory with a theme (at  a higher level). For 
example, in South-Slavic oral tradition the decasyllabic line, the deseterac, is associated with the 
genre of epic; in the written tradition of English literature, the form of the sonnet is associated 
with the theme of romantic love. This feature interlink serves to bind together the multiform into 
less variable configurations than a non-interlinked multiform would be.24  The more a particular 
multiform is repeated, the more the process of traditional referentiality binds together features, 
and traditional multiforms are, by definition, repeated (else they would not be traditional). The 
binding of features together in complexes makes some areas of morphospace inaccessible to a 
reasonably long multiform, not only  because some particular feature combinations will not be 
possible, but because an interlinked multiform may  not  be able to traverse particular regions of 
morphospace leading to a higher summit. The more tightly bound a multiform is, the smaller the 
area of the adaptive landscape that will be occupied by its variants. When we combine this 
process with the hill-climbing behavior of entities in a competitive, evolutionary environment, 
we generate an adaptive landscape characterized by mountains surrounded by plains or valleys of 
non-adaptive morphotypes.
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The Traps of Local Maxima
There is selection pressure on every 
lineage to evolve toward forms that are higher up 
the adaptive landscape, but because the landscape 
is not homogeneous, not every  point leads to 
every  other point by simple hill-climbing. In 
Figure 5 we see that an entity that starts at point x 
can evolve to point y, but point z is not reachable 
without a significant decrease in fitness that 
would enable the entity  to move lower in the 
landscape (crossing the valley) before moving up 
the peak towards the higher summit z. This 
decrease in fitness is prevented by all the entities 
that have the same form as y outcompeting those that move slightly down from the y summit. 
Therefore, y is a local maximum at which the form is trapped.
In biology, a population of organisms that has reached a local maximum and becomes 
reproductively isolated is taken to be a species (Sewall Wright 1932; Simpson 1953:155-59). The 
problem of species or incipient species escaping the traps of local maxima has spawned an 
enormous amount of theoretical population biology that is beyond the scope of the argument in 
this essay,25  but suffice it to say that genetic drift, external perturbation, hybridization, and 
movement through an adaptive landscape on “ridges” have all been shown to move species away 
from local maxima traps.26  For our purposes it is enough to recognize that local maxima serve as 
attractors in the adaptive landscape, that they can trap lineages even though we can see that  there 
are other locations in morphospace with higher fitness, and that some kind of significant change 
in the environment is required to move the lineage away from the local maximum.27 
Furthermore, since for the most part we examine relatively stable systems that we only notice 
because they have already evolved to fit their environments, the adaptive landscape at any given 
time is likely to be populated only at the fitness peaks, giving us the illusion that species or 
genres were always separate. However, if we trace backwards the movement of lineages in the 
adaptive landscape, we can see that what are at a given time separate species on distant peaks 
must have originated much lower in the fitness landscape, and while they were in these flatter 
locations, they  had more flexibility  in the evolution of form because flatter morphospace allows 
for greater freedom of variation. In completely  flat  morphospace a move in any direction is as fit 
as the original location. As morphospace becomes more hilly, some moves become superior to 
the original location, but others become inferior. Thus total variability is lessened as the relief of 
the landscape increases.
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see the essays in Ziman 2000. 
26  It should be noted that some of these models are controversial; Gavrilets is careful to note dissenting 
voices. I have found his third chapter particular illuminating (2004:53-80). 
27 For further discussion, see Perkins 2000. 
Figure 5. Entities trapped at local maxima in a rugged 
landscape.
Attractors in Morphospace
When we recognize different instances of a multiform as being all in some way “the same 
thing,” as varying within limits, we are making a Gestalt judgment of similarity at multiple and 
confounded levels of the morpho-semantic hierarchy: an Anglo-Saxon hearer would recognize 
Cædmon’s Hymn in either the eorðan or ylda forms despite the minor variation in line five. This 
Gestalt recognition of similarity can occur at any level of the hierarchy, from the entire poem to 
the theme to the type scene, formula, or even an individual word that is “the same” as its 
synonym. This is not inconsistent with Michael Nagler’s concept of an “underlying 
Gestalt” (1974:18) behind Homeric formulas,28 but it replaces the linguistically problematic idea 
of a “preverbal” or “relatively deep” Gestalt29 with the idea that the identification of similarity  is 
based on abstracted qualities. The recognition of fundamental similarity at differing levels of the 
hierarchy, then, is not limited to the formula, or even to oral traditional works; instead the 
cognitive processes allow us to say that West Side Story is in some way  the “same” as Romeo and 
Juliet.
To represent all the different possible types of similarity and difference between the two 
artifacts, we would need to compare adaptive landscapes in multiple dimensions—a task beyond 
the visualization powers of our minds. However, if we isolate a given high level, such as the 
semantic category  “love story” or the genre “Broadway musical,” or the tradition “Moslem 
epic,” we can visualize an appropriate landscape. The “Serbian Christian epic” mountain would 
be a large peak with many sub-summits that would represent, among others, the multiforms 
“Kosovo Cycle” and “Stories of Kraljević Marko.” “Little Red Riding Hood” would be a large 
massif with many large summits, representing related morphologies in different languages and 
traditions (that is, the similarity  would be at different levels of the morpho-semantic hierarchy).30 
Each lineage would have moved up the peak by evolving to be more and more fit  to the cultural 
contexts in which it existed.
The difference between literary works, which are defined by texts fixed at the level of 
individual words and sentences, and oral traditional multiforms, which are fixed at more abstract 
levels of morpho-semantic hierarchy, would be visible if we zoomed in further on the summit of 
the peak. A fixed text of Cædmon’s Hymn occupies a single point in morphospace, and even the 
small variants we have documented only occupy four points. But the “Stories of Kraljević 
Marko” summit would be made up of smaller sub-peaks: “Marko Drinks Wine During 
Ramadan,” “Kraljević Marko and Musa the Robber,” and “The Death of Kraljević Marko,” with 
each of these sub-peaks surrounded by morphospaces representing variations particular to Mujo 
Kukuruzović or Ibro Bašić and changing even from performance to performance.
458 MICHAEL D. C. DROUT
28 Nagler argues that a poet “takes in many hundreds of lines . . .  from all of which he develops an intuitive 
feel for an underlying Gestalt which is retained in his unconscious mind probably in some unknown way that the 
phrasal impulses of any natural language are retained in the mind” (1974:18-19). 
29  One reason that linguists replaced the phrase “deep structure” with “d-structure” is the persistent mis-
equation of “underlying meaning” (which is what Nagler means here) with grammatical “deep structure.” 
30 For more discussion, see Zipes 1993 and 2006.
The geometry  of adaptive morphospace shapes the evolution of cultural entities in the 
same way that hydrodynamics shapes fish, but there is a limit to how much similarity is thus 
produced. Which local peak a meme-plex evolves toward is a function both of the shape of 
morphospace and the contingent factors of the history of the particular lineage. Entities within a 
multiform or within a larger genre are similar in form because the selection pressure to fit the 
adaptive landscape led them to the same areas of morphospace at various levels of the morpho-
semantic hierarchy, but entities that evolved into similar forms are usually (though not always) 
similar because they have similar ontogenies. Although the forms that have risen up  the 
mountain to reach similar peaks may not have begun at the same spot in the landscape, their 
passage through any bottlenecks in morphospace on their way to the summit will have forced 
them to have—at that specific point in time—similar morphologies.
Additionally, the shapes of adaptive landscapes are not static but  evolve over time as the 
populations evolve. This may seem a counterintuitive proposition, as adaptive landscapes 
represent the full possible morphospace of an entity, but the presence of variously adapted 
entities in the landscape can make some forms less or more adaptive or open up  new areas of 
morphospace, changing the relative height of different peaks. Changes in population density can 
affect the fitness of different morphologies: a form that is very fit when there are few same-
species competitors can be a handicap  in crowded circumstances (Blute 2010:81-83). But 
although the adaptive landscape changes, at any given time the particular features of a rugged 
landscape still serve as attractors.
The Pull of the Prototype
As rich and complex as our model to this point is, it  has not yet gone beyond biology and 
so does not account for some dynamics that may be unique to cultural evolution. “Natura non 
facit saltus,” (“Nature does not make leaps”) wrote Darwin, summing up a great deal of 
observational knowledge. The theory of Natural Selection shows that nature does not need to 
make leaps in form, that  all the existing forms in nature can be accounted for by the slow and 
steady  processes of selection, without the need for “hopeful monsters.”31  Mathematical work on 
adaptive landscapes has further shown that even seemingly  inaccessible peaks can be reached 
merely through genetic drift, and peaks themselves can shift through stochastic processes (Mayr 
1942:54; Carson 1968; Carson and Templeton 1984; Templeton 1980; Kaneshiro 1980; 
Kaneshiro and Anderson 1989:43-76),32  so saltations are not necessary for biological evolution. 
But we do observe, at least from certain points of view, what look like saltations in cultural 
evolution, or at least the traversal of large areas of morphospace without the visible presence of 
many intermediate forms. The sonnet having evolved, Shakespeare did not re-invent  the form 
when he wrote his first one, but we also do not view his works as having evolved from any 
particular individual poem that inspired him. Rather, Shakespeare had the idea of the sonnet, a 
pattern higher in the morpho-semantic hierarchy than any specific string of words. He and other 
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32 For a history see Provine 1989. 
poets had recognized the salient features—the generic characteristics—of the sonnet and formed 
a conception of what a sonnet should be. His individual sonnets evolved in part from features of 
individual poems but more significantly from the contours of a mental abstraction of a sonnet in 
his mind.
Mathematically, an attractor is simply  a set towards which a dynamical system evolves 
over time. In an adaptive landscape, it is a location to which the combination of selection with 
mere stochastic variation will drive the evolution of morphology. But culture-space is not the 
same as physical, biological space because much of culture occurs in minds, and even though it 
has at its root a material cause, the mental world operates somewhat differently than physical 
space. Cultural entities can therefore perform seeming saltations, apparent jumps through 
morphospace, much more easily than can biological entities. This dynamic complicates the 
metaphor of the adaptive landscape. For example, impossibly  deep  valleys can be crossed 
through the ability  of some cultural forms to jump from one peak to another. Because these 
saltations occur in minds, we must import some specifics of mental processes into the theory. 
This we can do by drawing on research in cognitive psychology, specifically  Eleanor Rosch’s 
classic work on the mind’s categorization system and the formation of prototypes in her 
“Principles of Categorization” chapter (1978:27-48) in Cognition and Categorization.33 Although 
research has continued on categorization and prototypicality, Rosch’s earlier papers have not 
been superseded, and they lay out very clearly  and at the most useful level of detail the processes 
that are of greatest relevance to the argument presented here.34
“Human categorization should not be considered the arbitrary product of historical 
accident or of whimsy,” writes Rosch, “but rather the result of psychological principles of 
categorization, which are subject to investigation” (1978:27). The perceptual and cognitive 
systems tend to categorize entities in the same ways even when the humans who are doing the 
categorization are very  different from each other (for instance, if they are from different cultures 
or backgrounds or are of different ages). The patterns of categorization discovered by 
psychologists, then, can be used cross-temporally and cross-culturally.
The first principle of categorization is that of cognitive economy: “the task of category 
systems is to provide maximum information with the least cognitive effort,” so that an organism 
can conserve finite cognitive resources. This principle leads to a balancing process, because it is 
beneficial for organisms both to have large numbers of categories that make fine discriminations 
and to reduce “the infinite differences among stimuli to behaviorally and cognitively usable 
proportions.” A cognitive system, therefore, will evolve to a middle ground between categories 
that are too broad and those that are too narrow. The principle of cognitive economy means that 
elaborated taxonomies are unlikely to be common except in special situations when they are 
particularly valuable, such as when subtle distinctions can be the difference between eating an 
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33 Although she summarizes her previous work in Rosch 1978, it is well worth reading the earlier studies 
(1973, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, and 1977) that led up to it. 
34  In my investigation of research in cognitive psychology I have been guided by Rolf Nelson; errors are 
entirely my own. 
edible or a poisonous plant (Berlin 1978).35  The second principle of the human categorization 
system is as follows: the world is not unstructured,36 “the material objects of the world possess a 
high correlational structure” (Rosch 1978:28-29). The attributes of objects are not uniformly 
distributed but instead connected to each other in ways that are probabilistic, so that in animals, 
for instance, wings most often occur with feathers and beaks, less often with fur, and never with 
scales. The brain has evolved to detect consistent coincidences in the environment,37  so the 
correlational structure of objects is readily noted and remembered.
These two principles cause category 
systems to have two dimensions. The vertical 
dimension “concerns the level of inclusiveness of 
the category” (Rosch 1978:27). This is the level 
along which the terms corgi, dog, carnivore, 
mammal, and living creature vary. The horizontal 
dimension represents the “segmentation of 
c a t e g o r i e s a t t h e s a m e l e v e l o f 
inclusiveness” (Rosch 1978:27). This is the level 
at which dog, fish, truck, chair, lake, and rock 
vary (see Figure 6).
Not all categories along the vertical 
dimension of categorization are equally useful, so 
there is selection pressure to choose the category that most effectively mirrors “the structure of 
attributes perceived in the world” (Rosch 1978:30). Furthermore, to increase the “distinctiveness 
and flexibility” of the categories in the horizontal dimension, “categories tend to become defined 
in terms of prototypes or prototypical instances that contain the attributes most representative of 
items inside and least representative of items outside the category” (Rosch 1978:30). These 
cognitive prototypes38 shape the evolution and perception of multiforms.
Under the principle of cognitive economy, categories evolve to be separate and clear-cut, 
and although it  is not always possible to carve the world at  the joints, prototypes are those cases 
in a category in which membership is most clear. Research shows that judgments of typicality are 
consistent even in regard to categories about whose boundaries the study subjects disagree and 
also across age, gender, cultural and ethnic categories (Rosch 1974; Rosch 1975a; Rosch 1975b; 
Rosch 1975c; Rosch and Mervis 1975). Categories are formed by the mind’s judgment of 
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35  The research on this topic is beyond the scope of this essay. For an accessible discussion in other 
contexts, see Davis 1997. 
36 Rosch is quick to note that we are discussing the perceived world as mediated through both the human 
perceptual system and pre-existing cognitive categories (1978:29). 
37  The neurological basis of the brain’s “coincidence detector” lies in the NMDA receptor, which allows 
calcium ions to flow only when both a pre-synaptic and post-synaptic signal are present (Kandel and Schwartz 
1996:284). 
38  Nagler argues that “the aspiring poet . . . does not memorize prototypes or templates” (1974:18). 
Although they may not explicitly memorize an abstract model, poets think like other human beings and thus must 
construct mental prototypes of poems and their features in the same ways that individuals construct mental 
prototypes of entities that are of interest to them. 
Figure 6. Cognitive categorizations on two axes.
similarity and difference. Although additional models such as that of Amos Tversky (1977) are 
also helpful for conceptualizing the abstract process involved,39  it is enough to follow Rosch’s 
conclusion that category prototypes “develop through the same principles, such as maximization 
of cue validity  and maximization of category resemblance, as those principles governing the 
formation of the categories themselves” (1978:36-37). Thus prototypes are built at the same time 
that categories are being developed. Once prototypes exist, subsequently encountered entities are 
compared to them. At times an individual entity in the real world may be a very  close match for 
the prototype (a robin may seem like a prototypical bird), but the mental entity is not the same as 
the physical one.40  The more prototypical a category member is, the more features it has in 
common with other members of the category  (Rosch and Mervis 1975), and when it is possible 
to measure prototypes in terms of size or other objective metrics, prototypes tend to be at  the 
mean of the other entities in the category (Reed 1972; Rosch et al. 1976). “Prototypes appear to 
be just those members of a category that most reflect the redundancy  structure of the category  as 
a whole” (Rosch 1978:37).
Prototypes, Influence, and the Adaptive Landscape
We can integrate this cognitive psychological research with our previous analysis by 
noting that prototypes will evolve to be like the forms at the peaks of the adaptive landscape, and 
having been constructed, they  in turn influence subsequent evolution. If entities are clustered at 
various local maxima around an adaptive peak they will, due to their relative positions in 
morphospace, share many features. The entities closer to the summit  should share the most 
features because these features are individually closer to each other than to any  of the more 
widely  distributed forms. Entities residing at  the peaks of adaptive landscapes thus become 
attractors in two ways. First, they occupy those areas of morphospace that are most fit and 
therefore are the forms towards which other entities are evolving (although these other entities 
may, at  any given time, be trapped on local maxima). Second, because the peak forms are the 
most likely to become prototypical, all other forms that are perceived as being part of the same 
category41 will be compared to those forms. For the purposes of pure categorization this standard 
of comparison does not seem particularly important, but because cultural evolution relies on the 
production and transmission of new forms from human minds, the prototype serves not only  to 
categorize but also to create new forms in a particular shape. The seeming saltations we find in 
human culture can thus be explained by noting the pull of the prototype, to which evolving forms 
are compared and which thus shapes the evolution of those forms.
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39  Tversky’s model is the subject of an enormous amount of research and is beyond the scope of this 
argument; see further Dehaene 2009:176-93. 
40 It seems to me that the psychologists may have independently reinvented Ferdinand de Saussure’s idea 
(1983) of the “signified” that exists only in various minds; this is not the only place where there is some overlap 
between cognitive psychology and (albeit outdated) theoretical linguistics. 
41 Generally, but not always, these forms are in a proximate part of the adaptive landscape—otherwise they 
would not be in the same category.
Figure 7 represents the first stages in this process. We begin with the multiform A, which 
is produced by  some participant in an oral tradition. (almost any multiform in which we are 
interested will not have arisen ex nihilo or even de novo, but for the purpose of this argument, let 
us assume entry into a new area of morphospace.) 
Some of the features of this multiform are judged 
to be salient by  human cognitive processes, and 
out of these salient features begins the evolution 
of a prototype, α. Another distinct but in some 
ways similar multiform, B, has some features that 
are similar to A but others that are different. If the 
Gestalt of B is similar enough to A for the two 
entities to be classified in the same category (as 
they  would be if they share enough features), then 
features of B are also abstracted, but instead of 
forming a second prototype, the abstracted 
features of B further shape prototype α, which 
remains the prototype for the entire category, not 
just for multiform A. Prototype α will now 
include the shared and salient features of both A 
and B. As participants in a tradition experience 
performances C and D, they  will abstract 
additional features from these performances and 
recognize patterns—this information will in turn 
influence α. Let us assume that this particular 
prototype is held in the mind of an author who is 
now generating a new song. That new form, א, 
may  have some features of multiforms A, B, C, or 
D, but only  via the prototype, α. This model can 
be made more detailed and complex by allowing 
an individual entity to provide primary stimulus 
but having that primary stimulus be mediated 
through the already existing prototype, to which 
are added various feedback loops (see Figure 8).
The key point is that the movement from 
A-D to α and then from α to א is the way that the 
influence of the cognitive prototype works 
through the mediation of the human mind. From the point of view of an outside observer, the 
generation of a unique performance in a given tradition may appear to be a saltation: one small 
stimulus—perhaps hearing that United States President John F. Kennedy was assassinated42—
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42  After the Kennedy assassination, Jozo Karamatić,  a guslar from Herzegovina, composed and recorded 
“Smrt u Dalasu” in the epic style. Although the performance was recorded in audio only, there are now many on-line 
versions available in which the song is used as a soundtrack to imagery of the Kennedy assassination. One of the 
less sensationalistic versions is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qha-q9Wr9FI.
Figure 7. Influence model – oversimplified.
Figure 8. Influence model.
provokes the creation of a large and complex work that is somewhat different from the large and 
complex works that have come before. We can see why observers might think that something 
magical happened inside the human brain or that  the process was simply too complex to explain 
or that the prototype generated spooky action at a distance. But when we recognize that there has 
been significant information transfer from the world to the mind—in the categorization of 
entities and the creation of prototypes—the seeming poverty of the stimulus is no longer a 
problem. A given work or event may be the proximate cause of inspiration, but the matrix in 
which that  work exerts influence is the long-term building of cognitive categories, the evolution 
of mental prototypes in the adaptive landscape.
For these processes to work, however, entities A, B, C, and D must be similar enough in 
perceived features for the mind to try to categorize them together and build a prototype from 
their shared features. Such similarity  can be caused by homology, analogy, or random chance. 
Homology is similarity caused by shared inheritance. The seven neck vertebrae in most mammals 
from shrews to pigs to giraffes is an example of homology: an ancestor had seven neck vertebrae, 
and the path through morphospace for longer necks has involved increasing the size of each of 
those bones rather than growing additional ones (except in the case of the sloth). Homology 
among cultural entities arises when they have common ancestors: their lineages have moved 
them through the same areas of morphospace. Analogies occur when the external world forces a 
particular shape on an entity. The aerodynamic properties of the wings of birds, bats, and 
pterosaur are the same not due to shared descent, but because the laws of gravity  and 
aerodynamics admit no exceptions, so that any creature that flies will have wings with essentially 
the same cross-section. The fitness constraints force the form.
The human mind is quite happy to lump together both types of similarity  (and so 
taxonomists must often struggle to separate homology  from analogy in order to classify animals 
phylogenetically). The principle of cognitive economy ensures that categories will be created 
around the most visible and distinct features, so prototypes are based upon common features 
regardless of their ontogenies. The mind builds the prototype from all things that are similar in 
morphology, and once the prototype is built, subsequent cultural evolution will be based to a 
degree on that prototype. This process allows variation in non-diagnostic categories to enter the 
chain of transmission, as unrelated entities are treated as part of the same categories, but it  also 
smoothes out variation, as characteristics not consistent with the prototype are less likely to be 
passed through into a subsequent generation. The interaction of these competing processes helps 
explain both the “variation” and “within limits” characteristic of oral traditional multiforms.43 
Smoothing is also facilitated by the sharing of prototypes throughout a culture. Although each 
prototype in each mind may be unique in its fine details, psychological research shows that there 
is a great deal of inter-personal agreement as to the characteristics of the prototypical members of 
categories. This shared representation requires only a shared set of cognitive capacities coupled 
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43  Similarly the principles of communicative economy and metonymy, phenomena well known in oral 
tradition studies,  have the capability both to add variation and to smooth it away depending upon the particular 
circumstances. Metonymy can cause a variant form to be incorporated into a category if the aspect of the entity that 
is functioning as a metonym is the same in the entity and the prototype even when the entity as a whole is 
significantly different from the prototype. However, because pars pro toto metonymy can transfer not the particular 
variant form but instead a stereotyped version closer to the known prototype, this kind of transmission can remove 
variation as well.
to the error-correction mechanisms of social interaction: humans cannot  directly share their 
prototypes, but they can share characteristics of prototypicality by  communicating, both directly 
and through responses to observed behavior.
To be communicated, a prototype must be converted from whatever abstract set  of 
features is stored in the mind to some form that can be transmitted verbally, visually, or 
otherwise: this is the point in the process where we are able to observe instantiations of the 
multiform. The form that is communicated is likely to be that of a real-world example that is as 
close as possible to the abstract mental prototype. Communication and interaction will produce 
selection pressure for instantiations to be similar to the features shared in the prototypes of 
multiple individuals because these are indirectly compared in the production and reception of 
multiple performances. Correction through communication only  goes so far, however; idiolects 
persist in both language and culture.44  Thus, even evolution towards adaptive peaks plus the 
categorization system’s tendency towards prototypicality does not eliminate all variation from 
the culture (which, unsurprisingly, provides the variation that allows the system to continue to 
evolve). The prefix “multi-” is attached to “multiform” for a reason.
Variation within Limits
The shape of oral traditional morphospace 
at any given time includes various peaks in the 
adaptive landscape. Oral traditional multiforms 
evolve towards these attractors, moving up the 
peaks but at times getting trapped at local 
maxima. Once some number of multiforms have 
arrived at local maxima near each other, such as 
on the foothills of an adaptive peak, these 
multiforms are likely to be compared to each 
other and categorized. (They were similar to 
begin with as they were evolving in similar 
regions of morphospace.) When the multiforms 
are categorized together, a prototype is 
constructed from their features. This prototype 
can be represented as an entity  just above the 
adaptive peak for the particular region of 
morphospace, which in turn remains above the 
other multiforms, on the lower slopes of the peak 
(see Figure 9). There is a gap between the highest 
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44  The existence of so-called “mondegreens,” song lyrics or collocations that are misunderstood and then 
remembered and even re-transmitted in incorrect form (regardless of how ridiculous the form is), demonstrates that 
the perceptual system not only allows for but also creates a certain amount of variability (Sylvia Wright 1954). A 
surprising feature of the perceptual and mnemonic systems seems to be that once a lyric is misheard one way, it is 
very difficult to un-hear or re-hear it.
Figure 9. A cognitive prototype (represented by the 
sphere) influences the shape of an adaptive 
landscape.
point in the landscape and the prototype because no single instantiation is a perfect match for the 
cognitive construction. 
Selection pressure drives multiforms to evolve towards the morphology of the prototype, 
thus moving lineages into the higher fitness regions of morphospace. But because real-world 
instantiations are unable to become the prototype in all details, existing multiforms are trapped 
on local maxima. New multiforms, however, can enter the adaptive landscape without being 
influenced directly by  any of the existing multiforms, instead being influenced only by  the 
prototype. Some of these can potentially  jump to the top of the adaptive peak without being 
trapped at a local maximum, but there is no particular reason for the multiforms at the local 
maximum to go extinct (nothing is out-competing them in their local morphospace, since nothing 
in local morphospace has higher inclusive fitness than the entity  at the local maximum) and so 
they  remain as a cluster at the top of the peak below the prototype. This cluster of multiforms—
the local maxima surrounding the prototype at the higher maximum—is the population of 
multiforms for a particular tradition.
Cultural entities are not alive. They may evolve in ways analogous to biological 
evolution, but they  do not behave in precisely the same way. Multiforms do not go out and 
replicate on their own once released into an environment. They must be replicated by  human 
beings, and although this replication can be unconscious, it nevertheless is not independent from 
human agency. Therefore, in order to be replicated and to create an evolving lineage, cultural 
entities must somehow be perceived. One good way to be noticed is to be distinctive, but being 
distinctive means varying from the prototypical form of the multiform and thus potentially being 
less high up the peak of the adaptive landscape and hence less likely  to be replicated. There is a 
balance to be found between fitting in and standing out. Be too similar to the existing population 
and you will not be noticed enough to be replicated, but be too different and you do not fit into 
any existing category  and thus cannot take advantage of that  category’s prototype. So although 
there is continual selection pressure to be like the prototype, there is also pressure to retain some 
distinctiveness in each multiform: variation, but within limits.
These dynamics, closely analogous to the dynamics of speciation, create pressure for 
multiforms to maintain distinctiveness. The areas between attractors in the larger landscape are 
swept clear of other forms as these are pressured toward one or another of the attractors. Thus, in 
fully  mature multiforms or well-evolved genres we do not see a smooth gradient of varying 
forms spreading across a flat  adaptive landscape, but instead entities clustered on separate peaks 
(though these will have sub-summits). If a multiform enters a new area of the adaptive 
landscape, there is likely to be a radiation, a proliferation of new forms as entities rapidly 
diversify  to fill new niches. The particular form that enters the new area of the landscape may do 
so based only on contingent, historical, or even random factors, but once it is there the regular 
processes of radiation, speciation, and evolution towards peaks in morphospace will work, 
limited by the original material, to shape the resulting entities. After radiation there will also be 
consolidation into a reduced number of stereotyped forms, a pruning of the copiously branching 
bush (Gould 1991).
The populations of multiforms that we observe, therefore, will appear discontinuous for 
three reasons. First, the pressure on multiforms to differentiate from each other will produce a 
gappy, island-like landscape, with clusters of entities around the attractors. Second, at  any given 
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time we will not see all the intermediate stages through which multiforms moved through the 
adaptive landscape. The “fossil record” of culture, particularly  before widespread writing and 
recording, is sparse indeed and very few forms have ever been preserved. Only with recent 
developments in recording technology—and, perhaps equally important, intellectual 
developments valuing multiformity—have we begun to attempt to capture and preserve a full 
range of variant forms (see Honko 1998; Foley 2004). So when we look at multiforms in an 
adaptive landscape, they may appear to be separate islands, with, for example, wisdom poems 
being separate from epics which are also separate from elegies and from religious praise poems. 
But like the islands in an archipelago, entities that appear discontinuous on the surface are indeed 
linked below as is evident when viewed from a different vantage point.
Third, cognitive processes of creating 
and then matching to a prototype emphasize 
separation in order to make the categories 
more clear-cut. Psychological systems have 
evolved to de tec t pa t te rns tha t a re 
“meaningful” in the sense that the information 
detected is valuable for the organism and has good word-to-world fit. However, this large-scale 
development can be exploited by entities that themselves evolve to fit into the existing 
psychological tendencies: being like a prototype tends to cause a particular multiform to be 
reproduced—subject to the constraints of a dynamic balancing between fitting in and standing 
out. So we have co-evolution of lock and key, with various forms of selection pressure shaping 
the multiforms and the very existence of the particular multiform re-shaping the morphospace, 
which in turn changes the selection pressure. The existence of similar entities creates categories 
and prototypes, which are then attractors. This feedback loop leads to increasing complexity as 
lineages ramify through cultural space and interact with each other. The cultural ecosystem is 
shaped both by these consistent processes and by historical and contingent events, some of the 
effects of which are amplified by the ways they change adaptive morphospace.
Within that  landscape, a multiform is a related population of cultural entities that are 
recognized as being fundamentally “the same” by the categorization systems of the human mind. 
Depending upon particular cultural contexts, these entities are not always identical at the level of 
individual words (the level that print-centric individuals often intuit as a requirement for 
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Figure 10a. At a given time, regions of adaptive 
morphospace appear discrete.
Figure 10b. Areas of morphospace that appear discrete 
during a certain time interval (represented by the “sea 
level”) are historically continuous.
sameness), but are instead similar at different levels of the morpho-semantic hierarchy. This 
similarity has developed both by homology, when the entities have evolved to similar positions 
in the adaptive landscape and thus have similar features, and by analogy, when the entities were 
shaped by selection pressures to be like their prototypes and thus have similar features.
In examining and discussing a multiform, we can choose a particular level of the morpho-
semantic hierarchy at  which we compare various entities or different performances. Or we can 
select a particular individual performance as a representative of the entire multiform in the same 
way taxonomists select a type specimen for a species. Or we can construct an abstraction, an 
ideal case that may never have existed in that exact form, a new prototype based on our 
observations of various individual entities. We do all of these things because our minds have 
trouble thinking of a large, varying population in all its diversity. But if we reconceptualize that 
population as an adaptive landscape, shaped by a cognitive prototype and containing variation 
that is constrained by  morphospace around certain peaks, we may be able to harness our intuition 
to understand better the multiform nature of oral traditional entities. A central question of all 
studies of tradition is why traditions vary only  within limits even while the world around them 
changes. In investigating the structure, dynamics, and evolution of the multiform, we begin to 
see why we can recognize continuities of tradition across physical and temporal boundaries, and 
why traditions, despite being made of only thought and sound, persist through the centuries.
Wheaton College
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